BIS Announces $2 Million Settlement with Lambda Research Corporation for 66 Export Control Violations 

On October 2, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a $2 million administrative settlement with Massachusetts-based Lambda Research Corporation involving 66 alleged violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The case involved exports of optical and illumination design software, automatic software updates, and transactions with parties on the Entity List and Unverified List. 

Key Takeaways 

  • EAR99 does not mean unrestricted. Even software classified as EAR99 may require an export license when the recipient is on the BIS Entity List. 
  • Automatic software updates can constitute exports. BIS charged Lambda with violations involving software updates transmitted to restricted parties after their addition to the Entity List. 
  • Restricted-party screening must be ongoing. A customer who was not restricted when a transaction began may become subject to licensing requirements later. 
  • Distributors do not eliminate export compliance obligations. Exporters must evaluate the actual end users of their products, including transactions conducted through intermediaries. 
  • The Unverified List creates additional compliance requirements. Certain transactions involving Unverified List parties require a UVL statement even when an export license is not otherwise required. 
  • Informal compliance efforts are insufficient. BIS cited Lambda’s lack of written export compliance procedures, employee training, and designated compliance personnel. 
  • Voluntary self-disclosure does not eliminate penalties. […]

Treasury’s First Outbound Investment Penalty: $200,000 Against Amidi LLC 

On October 7, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the first civil penalty issued under its Outbound Investment Security Program (OISP): $200,000 against Amidi LLC, the U.S. parent company of the organization known as Plug and Play Tech Center, for failing to notify Treasury of an investment its Chinese fund subsidiary made in a Chinese embodied artificial intelligence company. 

The underlying investment was approximately $92,478. U.S. investors, venture funds, accelerators, and corporates with offshore investment vehicles should take note: the notification obligation reaches transactions by a U.S. person’s controlled foreign entities, and Treasury has now penalized a missed filing on a small deal. 

Key Takeaways 

  • Treasury imposed a $200,000 civil penalty on Amidi LLC for failing to notify Treasury of an investment of approximately $92,478 in a Chinese AI and robotics company. 
  • The investment was made by Amidi’s Chinese fund subsidiary. The OISP regulations require a U.S. person to notify Treasury of a notifiable transaction by its controlled foreign entity. 
  • The current rules contain no general de minimis threshold for notification, and the existing regulations at 31 CFR Part 850 remain in effect while Treasury implements the COINS Act. 

What Happened 

On April 19, 2025, a Chinese fund owned by Amidi invested approximately $92,478 in Shanghai Qiongche Intelligent Technology Company Limited (Noematrix), […]

Commerce Restricts Polysilicon Stockpiling Ahead of December 4 Section 232 Tariffs: What Importers and Customs Brokers Need to Know 

On September 24, 2026, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a temporary final rule at 91 FR 60505 establishing how the Department of Commerce will identify and restrict importers that stockpile polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives (Polysilicon Products) before the Section 232 minimum import prices and tariffs under Proclamation 11052 take effect on December 4, 2026. The rule caps weekly import volumes for new importers of record, creates a waiver process, and reminds customs brokers of their enforcement exposure. Importers of polysilicon, the covered HTSUS 3818 products, solar cells, and solar modules, along with the customs brokers that file their entries, are affected now. 

Key Takeaways 

  • BIS published a temporary final rule at 91 FR 60505 on September 24, 2026. It is effective September 22, 2026, through December 3, 2026. 
  • Commerce is monitoring existing importers of record (IORs). An IOR that Commerce determines is importing Polysilicon Products in volumes substantially greater than its historic averages will be prohibited from making further entries of those products prior to December 4, 2026. 
  • New IORs that registered with CBP on or after August 6, 2026, are prohibited from importing above fixed weekly quantities by HTSUS subheading, absent Commerce approval. 
  • Prohibited or restricted companies may apply to Commerce for a waiver at Polysilicon232@bis.doc.gov. Commerce intends to respond within 14 days of receipt. 

BIS FY2025 Annual Report Signals Major Increase in Export Enforcement 

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released its Fiscal Year 2025 Annual Report to Congress, providing a detailed look at the agency’s export control, licensing, and enforcement activity.  

Key Takeaways 

  • BIS reports an 18-fold increase in penalties, from approximately $16 million in calendar year 2024 to approximately $324 million in 2025. 
  • BIS completed 53 administrative enforcement actions, resulting in more than $108 million in civil penalties during FY2025. 
  • BIS enforcement activity included 455 warning letters, 705 detentions, 232 seizures, and 29 denial orders. 
  • BIS investigations resulted in 65 criminal convictions of individuals and companies during FY2025. 
  • BIS completed 1,840 end-use checks across 73 countries, demonstrating the agency’s ability to scrutinize transactions even after goods leave the United States. 
  • BIS added 142 entities to the Entity List, including parties associated with advanced computing, quantum technology, hypersonic weapons programs, and Iranian drone procurement. 
  • Licensing for Entity List parties has become significantly more restrictive: BIS reports granting only 16 new licenses to Entity List companies during Q2–Q4 2025. 
  • Exporters should reassess restricted-party screening, end-user and end-use diligence, product classification, licensing procedures, recordkeeping, and escalation protocols in light of […]
By |2026-09-11T14:55:38-04:00September 11, 2026|Best Practices, EAR, Enforcement, Export, U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)|Comments Off on BIS FY2025 Annual Report Signals Major Increase in Export Enforcement 

White House Releases National Security Science & Technology Strategy: What It Signals for CFIUS, Outbound Investment, and Export Controls 

As mandated by Section 10612 of the CHIPS and Science Act, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) issued the National Security Science and Technology Strategy (NSSTS), which implements the S&T priorities of the 2025 National Security Strategy. While framed as a technology strategy, the NSSTS previews concrete near-term action on CFIUS, outbound investment, export controls, and federal research security — direct touchpoints for clients in cross-border investment, controlled technology, and federally funded R&D. 

Key Takeaways 

  • CFIUS’ scope is set to expand. The Administration will seek authority, in consultation with Congress, to monitor high-risk “greenfield” investments and to expand CFIUS’s critical-technology jurisdiction, while continuing to calibrate scrutiny to an investor’s “verifiable distance” from adversary-linked actors under the America First Investment Policy’s allied fast-track approach. 
  • Outbound investment restrictions will broaden. Treasury will refine and likely expand the Outbound Investment Security Program (Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act of 2025) beyond its current scope – AI, quantum, semiconductors, supercomputers, and hypersonics – to reach additional sectors implicated by China’s military-civil fusion strategy. Although the current NSSTS did not reference other countries by name, the strategy will likely be implemented in a way that circumvents particular investments in Hong Kong, Macau, Cuba, Iran, Russia, Iran, and North Korea – in line with President Trump’s “America-first investment policy,” published in February 2025. 
  • Export controls: deregulation and new restrictions in parallel. BIS is streamlining select controls (e.g., a […]
By |2026-09-03T12:13:54-04:00September 3, 2026|CFIUS, EAR, Export, U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Treasury, Uncategorized|Comments Off on White House Releases National Security Science & Technology Strategy: What It Signals for CFIUS, Outbound Investment, and Export Controls 

BIS End-Use Checks: What Happens When an Export Control Officer Calls Your Customer 

BIS has published a plain-language FAQ on its End-Use Check program, the on-site visits its Export Control Officers conduct at foreign consignees and end users of U.S.-origin items. This article explains what those visits are, what your foreign customer will be asked to produce, the statutory and regulatory authority behind the request, and the consequences when a check cannot be completed. It matters because the penalty for a failed check falls on the exporter’s ability to ship, not only on the foreign party being visited. 

Key Takeaways 

  • An End-Use Check (EUC) is BIS verifying, on site and overseas, that your foreign customer is who it says it is and used your items the way the license or the EAR required. 
  • A failed or incomplete check does not need a finding of wrongdoing to hurt you. The customer can land on the Unverified List, license exceptions disappear, and every shipment then requires a UVL statement. 
  • Since October 2022, a check that stays incomplete for 60 days after Unverified List placement, because a host government blocks it, triggers Entity List proceedings. 
  • The exporter’s exposure is set before the visit ever happens: by the accuracy of the license application, the quality of the paper trail, and whether the foreign party was told what to expect. 
  • Diaz Trade Law prepares exporters […]
By |2026-09-03T12:03:09-04:00September 3, 2026|Best Practices, EAR, Enforcement, Export, U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)|Comments Off on BIS End-Use Checks: What Happens When an Export Control Officer Calls Your Customer 

Getting Off the SDN List: A Practical Guide to OFAC’s Administrative Reconsideration Process 

Landing on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) is one of the most consequential things that can happen to a company or individual doing business in or with the United States. Assets are frozen, U.S. persons are barred from dealing with you, and banking relationships evaporate almost overnight.  

The good news is that SDN designations are not necessarily permanent. OFAC maintains a formal process – administrative reconsideration – for petitioning to have a person, entity, or piece of property removed from an OFAC-administered sanctions list. This article walks through how that process works, what to expect at each stage, and where clients most often stumble. 

Step One: Confirm You’re Using the Right Process 

Before filing anything, it’s worth pausing to confirm which removal process actually applies to your situation, because OFAC’s administrative reconsideration process is not a one-size-fits-all remedy. 

  • You are the designated party. If you, your organization, or your property appear on an OFAC-administered list because OFAC itself made the designation, the administrative reconsideration process under 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 is the correct path, and it runs through OFAC’s Reconsideration Portal. 
  • The designation was made by the State Department. Some names appear on OFAC-administered lists because the Department of State designated them (for example, under certain terrorism-related authorities). Removal in those cases goes through […]
By |2026-08-27T16:15:24-04:00August 27, 2026|Export, U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)|Comments Off on Getting Off the SDN List: A Practical Guide to OFAC’s Administrative Reconsideration Process 

Bosch Agrees to Pay $36 Million Penalty to BIS for Unauthorized Shipments to Huawei 

Robert Bosch GmbH (Bosch), the German multinational engineering and technology company, has agreed to pay a $36,184,680 penalty to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for exporting controlled items to Huawei Technologies Co. and its affiliates without the required U.S. government authorization. 

What Happened 

Between September 2020 and September 2024, Bosch exported approximately $72.4 million worth of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) sensor products and automotive software from abroad to Huawei and its affiliates. The exported items were subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) under the Foreign Direct Product Rule, a rule that extends U.S. export controls to certain foreign-produced items that incorporate U.S. technology or are manufactured using U.S. equipment. Because Huawei and its affiliates are listed on BIS’s Entity List, any shipment of items subject to the EAR requires a license from BIS. No such license or authorization was obtained. 

The MEMS sensors at issue are widely used in consumer products, including smartphones, wearable technology, and automobiles. 

The Penalty 

In addition to the $36 million BIS civil penalty, Bosch separately agreed with the Department of Justice to disgorge profits from the transactions, with an actual payment of approximately $3.6 million. BIS suspended approximately $3.6 million of its penalty as credit for the disgorgement, bringing Bosch’s total financial exposure to roughly $39.8 million. 

Bosch filed a Voluntary Self-Disclosure with […]

By |2026-06-18T12:00:24-04:00June 18, 2026|EAR, Enforcement, Export, International Trade, U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)|Comments Off on Bosch Agrees to Pay $36 Million Penalty to BIS for Unauthorized Shipments to Huawei 

New OFAC Advisory: Signs of Sham Transactions and Sanctions Evasion post-divestment from Blocked Persons

On March 31, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released an important advisory addressing the growing use of sham transactions to evade U.S. sanctions. The guidance highlights how sanctioned individuals and entities often attempt to disguise their continuing interest in property through opaque legal structures, proxies, and other intermediaries. OFAC’s message is clear: transactions that merely appear to transfer ownership but do not genuinely extinguish a blocked person’s interest remain prohibited. 

What OFAC Defines as a “Sham Transaction” 

Sham transactions occur when blocked persons “give up their property on paper only,” while continuing to benefit from or control the asset. These arrangements often involve: 

  • Proxies, straw owners, or front companies acting on behalf of sanctioned individuals. 
  • Opaque legal structures, including multi‑layered LLCs, partnerships, or trusts. 
  • Transfers to family members or close associates who may serve as facilitators. 
  • Commercially unreasonable transfers, such as those lacking adequate consideration. 
  • Continued use or control of the asset by the blocked person after the purported transfer. 

Pro Tip: Look beyond legal formalities and identify the economic realities of the transaction. 

Red Flags Identified by OFAC 

The advisory outlines several indicators that a transaction may be a sham designed to evade sanctions. These include: 

By |2026-04-03T14:15:24-04:00April 3, 2026|Enforcement, International Law, International Trade, Investigation, U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)|Comments Off on New OFAC Advisory: Signs of Sham Transactions and Sanctions Evasion post-divestment from Blocked Persons

FinCEN Issues NPRM to Fully Implement Whistleblower Program

Authors:

Jennifer Diaz, President, Diaz Trade Law

Amber Pirson, Attorney, Diaz Trade Law


FinCEN’s March 30, 2026, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) marks a major step toward fully operationalizing the agency’s whistleblower program, designed to incentivize reporting of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), sanctions, IEEPA, and other illicit finance violations. The proposal outlines how whistleblowers can securely submit information, how awards will be determined, and what protections will be available.  

This development reflects the Treasury Department’s broader strategy to strengthen financial system integrity and encourage actionable tips that support enforcement efforts. For financial institutions, compliance professionals, and potential whistleblowers, the NPRM provides long‑awaited clarity on program structure and expectations. 

Overview of the Proposed Rule 

FinCEN’s NPRM proposes a comprehensive framework for administering whistleblower submissions and awards. Key elements include: 

  • Secure submission procedures for individuals reporting suspected violations of the BSA, OFAC sanctions, and related laws. 
  • Eligibility criteria for whistleblower awards, including documentation requirements and timelines. 
  • Award ranges of 10–30% of monetary penalties collected when a whistleblower’s information leads to a successful enforcement action. 
  • Robust protections for individuals who provide information, including confidentiality and anti‑retaliation safeguards. 

These provisions aim to encourage early, detailed reporting while ensuring whistleblowers are shielded from adverse consequences. 

Why FinCEN Is Prioritizing Whistleblower Incentives 

The NPRM aligns with Treasury’s broader […]

By |2026-04-03T10:52:11-04:00April 3, 2026|Enforcement, International Law, Trade Policy, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)|Comments Off on FinCEN Issues NPRM to Fully Implement Whistleblower Program
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